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Abstract. Following recent shootings in the USA, a debate has erupted, one
side favoring stricter gun control, the other promoting protection through more
weapons. We provide a scientific foundation to inform this debate, based on
mathematical, epidemiological models that quantify the dependence of firearm-
related death rates of people on gun policies. We assume a shooter attacking
a single individual or a crowd. Two strategies can minimize deaths in the
model, depending on parameters: either a ban of private firearms possession,
or a policy allowing the general population to carry guns. In particular, the
outcome depends on the fraction of offenders that illegally possess a gun, on
the degree of protection provided by gun ownership, and on the fraction of the
population who take up their right to own a gun and carry it with them when
attacked, parameters that can be estimated from statistical data. With the
measured parameters, the model suggests that if the gun law is enforced at a
level similar to that in the United Kingdom, gun-related deaths are minimized
if private possession of firearms is banned. If such a policy is not practical or
possible due to constitutional or cultural constraints, the model and parameter
estimation indicate that a partial reduction in firearm availability can lead to
a reduction in gun-induced death rates, even if they are not minimized. Most
importantly, our analysis identifies the crucial parameters that determine which
policy reduces the death rates, providing guidance for future statistical studies
that will be necessary for more refined quantitative predictions.
Introduction
Gun violence has been an ongoing problem in the United States of America,
with an incidence of gun-related homicides that is significantly higher than in
most developed nations [1]. While the pros and cons of gun control have been
debated in the past, e.g. [2], this issue has recently gained new momentum. On
December 14, 2012, the country witnessed one of the worst school shootings in
the history of the US, where 20 children and 6 adults were killed in Sandy Hook
Elementary School in Newton, CT. This has sparked an intense debate among
politicians, interests groups, and media personalities. On the one hand, this
tragedy has resulted in a call for tougher gun control laws. On the other hand,
there is the suggestion to arm the population in order to protect them against
offenders. This debate cannot be settled satisfactorily by verbal arguments
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alone, since these can be simply considered opinions without a solid scientific
backing. What is under debate is essentially a population dynamic problem:
how do different gun control strategies affect the rate at which people become
killed by attackers, and how can this rate be minimized?
This question can be addressed with mathematical models that describe the
interaction between a criminal shooter and one or more people that are the tar-
get of the shooter. The gun policy is defined as the fraction of the population
that can legally and readily obtain firearms. On the one hand, the availability
of firearms for a large fraction of the population facilitates the acquisition of
such weapons by criminals, and this can increase the rate of attack on people.
On the other hand, a relatively high prevalence of firearms in the population
can increase the chances of people to successfully defend themselves against an
attack, thus lowering the death rate [3, 4]. The mathematical models described
in this study aim to analyze this tradeoff and to suggest which type of gun pol-
icy minimizes firearm-related deaths under different assumptions. Calculations
are performed for two scenarios: the assault by a shooter of a single potentially
armed victim (what we call a one-on-one attack), or the assault of a crowd of
people that can be potentially armed (a one-against-many attack). Note that
the former scenario has been documented to be the most prevalent cause of
gun-related homicides [5–7]. The latter scenario corresponds to incidents such
as movie theater or shopping mall shootings and requires a more complicated
model. Although such one-against-many attacks are responsible for a small mi-
nority of gun-related homicides, they are an important focus of public attention
and are widely discussed in the press.
According to our models, both sides of the gun control argument could in
principle work, depending on parameter values. Gun-related deaths can be
minimized either by the ban of private firearms possession, or by a policy that
allows the general public to obtain guns. The following crucial parameters
determine the optimal gun control policy: (i) the fraction of offenders that
cannot obtain a gun legally but possess one illegally, (ii) the relative degree of
protection against death during an attack, conferred by gun ownership, and (iii)
the fraction of people who take up their legal right to own a gun and carry it
with them when attacked. These parameters can be estimated from published
statistical data. In the context of the parameter estimates, the model suggests
that if gun control laws are enforced at a level similar to that in the United
Kingdom, gun-related deaths can only be minimized by a ban of private firearm
possession. If this policy is impractical for cultural or constitutional reasons,
the parameterized model suggests that a partial reduction of firearm availability
lowers the gun-induced death rate, even though it does not minimize it. Most
importantly, the model identifies the crucial parameters that decide which policy
reduces gun-induced deaths, providing a guide for what needs to be measured
statistically in more detail.
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Results
To calculate the effect of different gun control policies on the gun-induced death
rate of people, we turn to the following mathematical framework. We consider
the correlates of the total rate (per year, per capita) at which people are killed
as a result of shootings. We introduce the variable g to describe the gun control
policy. This quantity denotes the fraction of the population owning a gun. A
ban of private firearm possession is described by g = 0, while a ”gun availability
to all” strategy is given by g = 1. We assume that a certain small fraction of
the population is violent, and that an encounter with an armed attacker may
result in death. The number of offenders that own firearms is a function of the
gun control policy g and is denoted by z(g). The probability of a person to
die during an attack is also a function of the gun control policy g because this
determines whether the person and any other people also present at the place
of the attack are armed and can defend themselves. This probability is denoted
by F (z). The overall risk of being killed by a violent attacker as a result of
shooting is thus proportional to
F(g) = z(g)F (g). (1)
An important aspect of this model is the form of the dependency of these two
quantities on the gun control policy, g. The number of armed attackers, z(g),
is a growing function of g, i.e. z′ > 0. Note, however, that even if offenders are
not allowed to legally obtain firearms, there is a probability h to obtain them
illegally. Hence, the value of z is non-zero for g = 0. One example of such a
function is given by the following linear dependence,
z(g) = g + h(1− g) (2)
with 0 < h < 1. The probability F for a regular person to die in an attack (once
he or she is at an attack spot) is a decaying function of g, F ′ < 0. One example
again is a linear function (see the following section). More generally, again we
could assume F ′′ > 0, see the one-against-many attack scenario below.
We start by examining the case where the quantities z and F are linear
functions of the fraction of people that can legally obtain firearms, g. This
corresponds to the situation when a shooter attacks a single individual in an
isolated setting, i.e. no other people are around to help defend against the
attack. It could also correspond to a classroom setting where a shooter attacks
the entire class, but only one person (the teacher) can be potentially armed
for protection. Subsequently, the more complex situation is examined where a
shooter attacks a group of people, each of which can be potentially armed and
contribute to defense. This would correspond to shootings in movie theaters,
malls, or other public places.
One-against-one attack
Here we consider the situation where an attacker faces a single individual who
can be potentially armed. The fraction of people owning guns in the population
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is defined by the legal possibility and ease at which guns can be acquired (g),
as well as the personal choice to acquire a gun. Moreover, people who own a
gun might not necessarily carry the firearm when attacked. Therefore, we will
assume that the fraction of people armed with a gun when attacked is given by
cg, where the parameter c describes the fraction of people who take up their
legal right of gun ownership and have the firearm in possession when attacked
(0 ≤ c ≤ 1). We will model the probability to be shot in an attack as
F (g) = β1(1− cg) + β2cg, (3)
a linear function of g, where β1 is the probability for an unarmed person to die
in an attack, and β2 is the probability for an armed person to die in an attack,
with β1 > β2. The number of attacks is proportional to z(g) given by equation
(2). The aim is to find the value of g that minimizes the death rate, F , given
by equation (1).
Optimization results. The first important result is that the killing rate can
only be minimized for the extreme strategies g = 0 and g = 1, and that inter-
mediate strategies are always suboptimal (this is because F ′′ < 0 for all g). In
words, either a complete ban of private firearm possession, or a ”gun availability
to all” strategy minimizes gun-induced deaths.
Further, we can provide simple conditions on which of the two extreme
strategies minimizes death. Let us first assume that
h < 1− c; (4)
this case is illustrated in figure 1(a) and interpreted below. Now, a ban of private
firearm possession always minimizes gun-induced deaths. This can be seen in
figure 1(a), where we plot the shooting death rate, F , as a function of the gun
policy, g, for several values of the quantity β2/β1. For all of these functions, the
minimum is achieved at g = 0.
Next, let us suppose that condition (4) is violated, that is, h > 1 − c, see
figure 1(b). In this case, a ban of private firearm possession minimizes death if
the following additional condition holds,
h <
β2
β1
c+ 1− c, (5)
Condition (5) defines a threshold value for h, the fraction of offenders that
cannot legally obtain a gun but possess one illegally. If h is smaller than the
threshold value, then the policy of choice is a ban of private firearm possession.
The threshold value provided by inequality (5) depends on the degree to which
gun ownership reduces the probability for the attacked person to die, β2/β1
(the smaller the quantity β2/β1, the higher the gun-mediated protection), and
on the fraction c of people who take up their right of legal gun ownership and
carry the gun with them when attacked. The right hand side of inequality (5)
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Figure 1: The rate of death caused by shooting in an one-against-one attack, as
a function of the gun control policy, g, where g = 0 corresponds to a ban of private firearm
possession, and g = 1 to the “gun availability to all” policy. (a) The fraction of people who
possess the gun and have it with them when attacked is relatively low, c = 0.6 < 1 − h with
h = 0.2. The different lines correspond to different values of β2/β1. For all values of β2/β1,
the shooting death rate is minimal for g = 0. (b) The fraction of people who possess the gun
and have it with them when attacked is relatively high, c = 0.9 > 1−h with h = 0.4. As long
as condition (5) holds, the shooting death rate is minimal for g = 0 (ban of private firearm
possession, solid lines). If condition (5) is violated, then the shooting death rate is minimized
for g = 1 (”gun availability to all”, dashed lines).
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decays with c. When c = 1 (everybody who has a right to a gun, carries a gun),
condition (5) takes a particularly simple form:
h <
β2
β1
. (6)
The case where inequality (4) is violated is illustrated in figure 1(b). Larger
values of β2/β1 satisfy condition (5), see the solid curves in figure 1(b). For
those curves, g = 0 (the total firearms ban) corresponds to the minimum of the
shooting death rate. If condition (5) is not satisfied (the dashed curves in the
figure), then the g = 1 (“gun availability to all”) policy is the optimum.
Note that the key condition (4) relates two quantities, which in some sense
are the opposites of each other: The first quantity is h, the probability that a
potential attacker who cannot legally possess a gun will obtain it illegally and
have it at the time of the attack. This can be a measure of law enforcement, with
lower values of h corresponding to stricter law enforcement. The other quantity
is 1− c, the probability that a person who can legally have a gun will not have
it available when attacked. To make the ban of private firearm possession work
(that is, to make sure that it is indeed the optimal strategy), one would have to
make an effort to enforce the law and fight illegal firearm possession to decrease
h. To make the “gun availability to all” policy work, one would have to increase
c, for example by encouraging the general population to have firearms available
at all times.
Partial restriction of gun-ownership. An important question is as follows.
Let us suppose that the total gun ban is impossible due to e.g. constitutional or
cultural constraints. Would a partial restriction of gun ownership help reduce
the firearm-related homicide rate? It follows that if
c <
1− h
(1− β2/β1)(2 − h)
, (7)
then any decrease in g will reduce the gun-related homicide rate. If the value
of c is in the interval
1− h
(1− β2/β1)(2 − h)
< c <
1− h
1− β2/β1
,
then the maximum death rate corresponds to an intermediate value of g (while
the minimum is at g = 0, the total ban). This means that if the current state
is g = 1, then a partial reduction in g may actually increase the gun-related
homicide rate. The reduction must be significant, that is, g has to be lowered
below a threshold, in order to see a decrease in the gun-related death rate.
Finally, if
c >
1− h
1− β2/β1
,
which is the opposite of condition (5), then depending on β2/β1, the minimum
of F may correspond to g = 1.
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A more general model of the victim population. Equation (3) defines
the death probability of a person involved in an attack. Comparing this equa-
tion with equation (2) we can see that in this model, we clearly separate the
population of attackers and the population of victims. The attackers carry a
gun with probability P attackergun = g+(1− g)h, which assumes that the attackers
will obtain a gun if it is legally available, and have a probability to also obtain it
illegally. The victims carry a gun with probability P victimgun = cg, which implies
that they never obtain a gun illegally, and even if it is legally available, they
may not have a firearm with them at the site of the attack. This could be an
appropriate model for homicide description in suburban and low-crime areas.
Below we will refer to this model as the “suburban” model.
It is however possible that the population of victims is similar to the popula-
tion of the attackers in the context of gun ownership, especially if we model the
situation in different socio-economic conditions, such as inner cities. The follow-
ing model is more appropriate for such situations: P victimgun = cg+c1(1−g)h1. It
states that a victim who is entitled to a legal weapon will have the gun available
at the time of the attack with probability c. Also, victims who cannot possess
a gun legally will acquire it illegally with probability h1 and have it with them
with probability c1. This model reduces to model (3) if h1 = 0 (no illegal gun
possession among the victims). If on the other hand we set h1 = h, then the
population of victims is the same as the population of attackers, apart from the
fact that the attackers have a gun with them with certainty (otherwise, there
would be no attack), and the victims may not be carrying a gun with them
(c, c1 < 1). We will refer to this model as the “inner-city” model. In the follwo-
ing text we explore how our conclusions are modified under this more general
model.
The g = 0 policy is the optimal as long as
β2
β1
> 1−
1− h
c− c1hh1
. (8)
Note that if h1 = 0, we have
β2
β1
> 1− 1−h
c
, which is the same as condition (5).
If h1 = h and c1 = c, we have
β2
β1
> 1 − 1
c(1+h) , which is a weaker condition
than condition (5). In general, increasing c1 and h1 makes condition (8) easier
to fulfill. Therefore, we can safely say that if condition (5) is fulfilled for the
“suburban” model, then it will be fulfilled for the “inner-city” model.
Furthermore, partial measures to reduce g from g = 1 will lead to a decrease
in the death toll as long as
β2
β1
> 1−
1− h
c(2− h)− c1h1
.
As before, with h1 = 0 we recover condition (7), and with an increase in h1 and
c1 lead to a weaker condition. Again, if partial reduction of the gun ownership
improves the death rate in the “suburban” model, it will also work in the “inner-
city” model.
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One-against-many attack
Here, we consider a situation where a shooter attacks a crowd of people, such
as in a movie theater or mall shooting. The difference compared to the previous
scenario is that multiple people can potentially be armed and contribute to
stopping the attacker. We suppose that there are n people within the range of
a gun shot of the attacker, and k of them are armed. We envisage the following
discrete time Markov process. At each time-step, the state of the system is
characterized by an ordered triplet of numbers, (α, i, j), where α ∈ {0, 1} tells
us whether the attacker has been shot down (α = 0) or is alive (α = 1), 0 ≤ i ≤ k
is the number of armed people in the crowd, and 0 ≤ j ≤ n− k is the number
of unarmed people. The initial state is (1, k, n− k).
At each time-step, the attacker shoots at one person in the crowd (with the
probability to kill 0 ≤ d ≤ 1), and all the armed people in the crowd try to
shoot the attacker, each with the probability to kill 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The following
transitions are possible from the state (1, i, j) with 0 ≤ i ≤ k, 0 ≤ j ≤ n − k
(below we use the convention that expressions of type i/(i+ j) take the value 0
for i = j = 0):
• (1, i − 1, j): one armed person is shot, the attacker is not shot, with
probability d i
i+j (1 − p)
i−1;
• (1, i, j − 1): an unarmed person is shot, the attacker is not shot, with
probability d j
i+j (1 − p)
i;
• (0, i−1, j): one armed person is shot, the attacker is shot, with probability
d i
i+j [1− (1− p)
i−1];
• (0, i, j − 1): an unarmed person is shot, the attacker is shot, with proba-
bility d j
i+j [1 − (1− p)
i];
• (0, i, j): no potential victims are shot, the attacker is shot, with probability
(1 − d)[1− (1− p)i];
• (1, i, j): no one is shot, with probability (1− d)(1 − p)i.
This model is considered in detail in the Analysis section. For n > 1, F (g) is a
decaying function of g, with F ′′ > 0 for all n > 1. The following empirical model
mimics the key properties of the overall risk of being shot in a one-against-many
attack:
F = [g + (1− g)h]e−βcg+γ(cg)
2
, (9)
where parameter c is again the fraction of all the people who take up their
legal right of gun ownership and carry the gun with them when attacked. The
parameter β measures the effectiveness of the protection received from the guns,
and parameter 0 < γ < β/(2c) is used to better describe the curvature of
function F (g) obtained from the exact model. The empirical model (9) has the
advantage of simplicity, which allows for a straightforward analysis.
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The optimal strategy that minimizes the gun-induced death rate of people
again depends on the degree of law enforcement (i.e. the probability for offenders
to obtain firearms illegally). More precisely, we have to evaluate the inequality
h < e−cβ. (10)
Again, the limiting case of this inequality corresponds to the case of c = 1:
h < e−β. (11)
There are two cases:
• If inequality (10) holds (tight law reinforcement and/or gun protection
ineffective), then the “ban of private firearm possession” policy (g = 0) is
optimal.
• If h > e−cβ (lax law reinforcement and/or gun protection highly effective),
then depending on the value of γ we may have different outcomes. Namely,
if γ < β2c −
1−h
2c2 , then the g = 1 (gun availability to all) policy is optimal.
Otherwise, the optimal policy corresponds to an intermediate value of g:
g =
β(1− h)− 2cγh+
√
(β(1 − h)− 2cγh)2 − 8γ(1− h)(1− h− βch)
4cγ(1− h)
< 1.
Discussion
We analyzed mathematical models in order to calculate the gun-induced death
rate of people depending on different gun control strategies. The gun control
strategies were expressed by a parameter that describes the fraction of the pop-
ulation that can legally own firearms. The strategies can range from a ban of
private firearm possession to a ”gun availability to all” strategy. We first inves-
tigated a situation in which one shooter is faced by only a single person that
could potentially own a gun and that could fight back against the shooter. This
can correspond to a one-on-one attack, such as a robbery, or a school shooting
where the only person in the classroom that could carry a gun is the teacher.
Subsequently, we examined a different scenario where a shooter faces a crowd
of people, all of which could potentially own a gun and fight back against the
attacker. This corresponds to shootings in public places such as movie theaters
and malls. The predictions of the model are similar for all scenarios. An im-
portant parameter is the degree of law enforcement relative to the amount of
protection that gun ownership offers. If the law is enforced strictly enough, a
ban of private firearm possession minimizes the gun-induced death rate of peo-
ple.
The question arises how strict the law has to be enforced for the a ban of
private firearm possession to minimize the gun-induced death of people. Accord-
ing to our results, this depends on the degree to which gun ownership protects
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potential victims during an attack and on the fraction of people who take up
their legal right of gun ownership and carry the gun with them when attacked.
These parameters in turn are likely to vary depending on the scenario of the
attack and are discussed as follows.
One-against-one scenario. The most prevalent use of guns is a one-against-
one scenario and largely involves handguns [5, 6]. For this case, model predic-
tions are relatively simple. Only one of the two extreme strategies can minimize
gun-induced deaths, i.e. a ban of private firearm possession or a ”gun availabil-
ity to all” strategy. Intermediate gun policies lead to sub-optimal outcomes.
Which strategy minimizes death depends on conditions that are easily inter-
preted. Gun-induced deaths are always minimized by a firearm ban if h < 1−c.
That is, we have to compare h, the fraction of offenders that illegally own a gun,
with 1−c, the fraction of the general population that could legally own a firearm
but does not have it in possession when attacked. If the condition above is not
fulfilled, gun-induced deaths can be minimized by either strategy, depending
on the fraction of offenders who illegally obtain firearms relative to the level of
protection offered by gun-ownership during an attack. If c = 1 (all people take
up their right of gun ownership and carry it when attacked), the conditions is
simplest, and a ban of private firearm possession minimizes gun-related deaths
if h < β2/β1, where β2/β1 is inversely correlated with the degree of protection
offered by gun ownership to a victim during an attack, with β2/β1 = 0 meaning
total protection, and β2/β1 = 1 corresponding to no protection associated with
gun ownership. All these variables can be estimated from available statistical
data, and the implications are discussed as follows.
In order to examine the fraction of offenders that cannot legally obtain a gun
but own one illegally, h, we have to turn to a country with tough gun control
laws. If a majority of people can legally own a gun, those that have to obtain one
illegally is a negligible fraction. England and Wales have one of the strictest
gun control laws since the 1997 Firearms Act, banning private possession of
firearms almost entirely with the exception of some special circumstances [8].
Estimating the fraction of potential offenders that illegally carry firearms is a
difficult task. Most statistics quantify gun uses during the acts of offense, not
among potential offenders. One study tried to fill this gap of knowledge by
interviewing a pool of offenders that passed through prison [9]. This was done
in the context of the New English and Welsh Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring
Programme (NEW-ADAM), covering a three year period between 1999-2002,
and involving 3,135 interviewees. Among these offenders, 23% indicated that
they had illegally possessed a gun at some point in their life. However, only 8%
indicated illegal gun ownership within the last 12 months, which we consider
a better measure of gun possession associated with committing crimes. More
detailed questions revealed that only 21% of people who owned a gun did so
for the purpose of an offense. Similarly, among the 8% of people who illegally
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owned a gun within the previous 12 months, only 23% had taken the gun with
them on an offense. Thus, as an estimate for the parameter h, we can say that
23% of the 8% constitutes people who illegally owned a gun which was also
present during the offense, and hence h = 0.018.
The fraction of people who legally own a firearm and have it in possession
when attacked, c, can be partially estimated. Statistical data are available about
the fraction of people who personally own a gun in the United States, but no
data are available that quantify the probability that these gun owners have the
weapon with then when attacked. Approximately 30% of all adult Americans
own a gun [10, 11]. Because not all of them will have the firearm with them
when attacked, we can say that c < 0.3. In this scenario, a ”gun availability to
all” policy can minimize firearm-related deaths if c > 1 − h, i.e. if 0.3 > 0.982.
This condition is clearly violated, and so the model predicts that gun-related
deaths are minimized by a ban of private firearm possession. It is possible that
the fraction of offenders that illegally carry a firearm derived from the study
by [9] is an underestimate. This study analyzed gun ownership among a prison
population. It is conceivable that among those offenders, only a certain propor-
tion has sufficient violent intention, and that among those people the frequency
of gun ownership is higher. According to our calculations, however, the ”gun
availability to all” policy can only minimize gun-induced deaths if more than
70% of potential offenders illegally owned a firearm, i.e. if h = 0.7 or higher,
depending on how many of the legal gun owners are likely to carry the firearm
when attacked. This is unlikely to be the case given the results obtained by [9],
but needs to be investigated statistically in more detail.
For the sake of the argument, let us consider the extreme scenario where all
people who can legally own a gun do so and carry it with them at the time of
an attack. This would require an effort by the government to persuade people
to purchase firearms and carry them around at all times. As mentioned above,
gun-related death is now minimized if h < β2/β1. The inverse relative protection
that gun ownership provides during an attack (β2/β1) has also been statistically
investigated [12]. This is best done in a setting where a large fraction of the
general population carries firearms, such as in the USA [1], and this study has
been performed in Philadelphia. A total of 677 individuals assaulted with a
gun were investigated and the study involved a variety of situations, including
long range attacks where the victim did not have a chance to resist, and direct,
short range attacks where the victim had a chance to resist. The study found
that overall, gun ownership by potential victims did not protect against being
fatally shot during an attack. In fact, individuals who carried a gun were more
likely to be fatally shot than those who did not carry a gun. This also applies to
situations where the armed victims had a chance to resist the attacker, and in
this case, carrying a gun increased the chance to die in the attack about 5-fold.
The authors provided several reasons for this. Possession of a gun might induce
overconfidence in the victim’s ability to fight off the attacker, resulting in a
gun fight rather than a retreat. In addition, the element of surprise involved in
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an attack immediately puts the victim in a disadvantageous position, limiting
their ability to gain the upper hand. If the victim produces a gun in this pro-
cess rather than retreat, this could escalate the attacker’s assault. These data
would indicate that β2/β1 > 1, which in turn would again mean that a ban of
private firearm possession is the only possible strategy that can minimize the
gun-related death of people (the probability h is by definition less than one).
The results of this study have, however, been criticized on statistical grounds
and it is currently unclear whether β2/β1 is indeed greater than one [13, 14].
Results are also likely to depend on the geographical location. This study was
conducted in a metropolitan area, and results might differ in smaller cities or
more rural areas. However, the general notion that gun ownership does not
lead to significant protection is also underlined by other studies that discussed
the effectiveness of using guns as a defense against attacks [15–18], especially
in a home setting, although parameter estimates cannot be derived from these
studies. In a literature review, no evidence was found that gun ownership in
a home significantly reduces the chances of injury or death during an intru-
sion [18]. Even if this estimate of β2/β1 is somewhat uncertain, and even if
its true value is less than one, the measured parameter h = 0.018 means that
firearm possession during an attack must reduce the chances of being fatally
shot more than 50-fold for the ”gun availability to all” policy to minimize the
firearm-related deaths of people, i.e. the value of β2/β1 must be less than 1/50.
This is unlikely in the light of the above discussed studies and again points to a
firearms ban for the general population to be the correct strategy to minimize
gun-induced deaths.
It is important to note that while according to the measured parameters,
a ban of private firearm possession minimizes the gun-induced death rate, the
implementation of such a policy might be impractical in some countries like
the USA, because of constitutional and cultural constraints. It might only be
practical to consider the option of partially restricting firearm access. In general,
the model suggests that this might either decrease of increase the gun-induced
death rate, depending whether condition (7) is fulfilled, which in turn depends
on the measured parameter values. To interpret condition (7), let us suppose
that h≪ 1, as measured by [9]. Then we have the condition
c <
1
2(1− β2/β1)
that guarantees that any reduction in g provides an improvement in safety.
In the most extreme scenario where the gun-assisted protection is the highest
(β2/β1 = 0), the threshold value of c is given by
c <
1
2
.
That is, as long as less than 50% of people have the gun with them at the time
of an attack, a decrease in gun-ownership would decrease gun-related homicides.
12
-4 -3 -2 -1 0
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
-4 -3 -2 -1 0
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
-4 -3 -2 -1 0
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
-4 -3 -2 -1 0
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
lo
g 
   
d 
10
log    p
10
lo
g 
   
d 
10
log    p
10
lo
g 
   
d 
10
log    p
10
lo
g 
   
d 
10
log    p
10
n=5 n=10
n=20 n=40
−0.1
−0.2
−0.3
−0.4
−0.5
−0.6
−0.2
−0.4
−0.6
−0.8
−1.2
−1
−0.5
−1.5
−1
−2
−2.5 −5
−4
−3
−2
−1
Figure 2: One-against-many attacks: when is a ban of private firearm possession
the optimal policy? Presented are the contour-plots of the threshold value log10(e
−cβ)
with c = 0.3, as a function of log
10
p and log
10
d for four different values of n. Darker colors
indicate smaller values, and the contour values are marked. For each pair of probabilities p
and d, the plots show the highest possible value of log10 h still compatible with the ban of
private firearm possession being the optimal policy. The black dashed lines on the bottom
two plots indicate the approximate location of the contour corresponding to h = 0.018; above
those lines the ban of private firearm possession is the optimal solution. These lines are drawn
according to the following relationship between d and p: d = 4p for n = 20, and d = 30p for
n = 40. For n = 5 and n = 10, the inequality h < e−cβ holds for any values of p and d, and
the ban of private firearm possession is the optimal solution in the whole parameter space.
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With the estimate of c ≈ 0.3 provided by statistical data, this condition holds.
This means that even in the case of very efficient weapons and high training of
those who use them (β2/β1 = 0) a reduction in g would be beneficial for the
society. In reality, the gun-related protection is not as high (which corresponds
to higher values of β2/β1), and the threshold value of c is most likely to be
higher than 1/2, which means that most certainly a partial restriction on gun
ownership would provide benefit for reducing gun-related homicide rate.
One-against-many scenario. Next, we discuss the one-against-many sce-
nario. Here, two different gun control policies can again potentially minimize
firearm-induced deaths of people: either a ban of private firearm possession,
or arming the general population. However, in the latter case, not necessar-
ily the entire population should carry firearms, but a certain fraction of the
population, which is defined by model parameters. As in the one-against-one
scenario, which policy minimizes gun-induced fatalities depends on the fraction
of offenders that cannot legally obtain a gun but carry one illegally, the degree
of gun-induced protection of victims during an attack, and the fraction of people
who take up their right of gun ownership and carry the gun with them when
attacked. In contrast to the one-against-one scenario, however, this dependence
is more complicated here. In the empirical model described above, the degree
of gun-mediated protection against an attack is given by the parameter β. This
is a growing function of n (the number of people involved in the attack) and
p (the probability for a victim to shoot and kill the attacker with one shot).
Further, β is a decaying function of d, the probability for the attacker to kill a
victim with one shot. For a ban of private firearm possession to minimize gun-
related deaths, the fraction of violent people that cannot obtain a gun legally
but obtain one illegally must lie below the threshold given by condition (11),
i.e. h < e−cβ. Let us again assume that 30% of the general population owns
a gun, and for simplicity that they all carry the firearm with them when at-
tacked (c = 0.3). The dependence of the function e−cβ on the parameters p, d,
and n is studied numerically in figure 2. Parameter d, the probability for the
attacker to kill a person with one shot, varies between 10−2 and 1. Parameter
p, the probability for an armed person to kill the attacker with one shot, varies
between 10−4 and 1. The log10 of the right hand side of inequality (11) is rep-
resented by the shading, the lighter colors corresponding to higher values. The
dependence on parameters p and d is explored for different numbers of people
in the crowd that is being attacked (n = 5, 10, 20, 40). For each case, we ask
what values of p and d fulfill the inequality h < e−cβ, assuming the estimated
value h = 0.018. In the parameter regions where this inequality holds, a ban of
private firearm possession will minimize deaths, and outside those ranges, it is
advisable that a fraction of the population is armed. For n = 40 we find that
a ban of private firearm possession requires d > 30p. i.e. the attacker needs to
be at least 30 more efficient at killing a victim than a single victim is at killing
the attacker. For n = 20 it requires d > 4p. For n = 10 and n = 5, a firearms
ban minimizes gun-related deaths for any value of p and d. Thus, for smaller
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crowds, condition (11) is easily satisfied and a ban of private firearm possession
would minimize deaths. For larger crowds, a ban of private firearm possession
would only make sense if the attackers were significantly more efficient compared
to the victims to deliver a fatal shot. The meaning of these numbers further
depends on the weapon carried by the attacker. Strictly speaking, the model
considered here was designed for attackers and victims with similar weapons.
The victims would typically possess hand guns. If the attacker also uses a hand
gun, it can be questioned whether the attacker is 30 times more efficient at fa-
tally shooting someone than a victim, even if the attacker is better trained and
has more experience. Therefore, if most gun attacks in the country involved a
one-against-many scenario with a crowd of about forty people or larger being
assaulted by a non-automatic weapon, firearm-induced deaths would be mini-
mized by a policy that allows a certain fraction of people to carry guns. For
smaller crowds, a firearms ban is likely to minimize deaths. In many situa-
tions, and certainly in the last string of mass shootings in the USA, automatic
weapons were used to assault crowds, where hundreds of rounds per minute can
be fired. The victims typically will not possess such powerful weapons. There-
fore, their ability to shoot is significantly lower than that of the attacker. We
can interpret the results of the model for a situation where the attacker fires
a machine gun and the victims respond with non-automatic weapons. In this
case we must assume that the probability of victims to fire and shoot the killer
is significantly (perhaps 2 orders of magnitude) lower than that of the attacker.
In this case, a ban of private firearm possession minimizes gun-related deaths
even if most cases of gun violence involve the assault of relatively large crowds
(such as n = 40).
Now, for the sake of the argument assume that c = 1, i.e. that everybody
who can legally own a gun does so and has it in possession when attacked. The
calculations yield the following results. For n = 40, a firearms ban requires that
d > 125p, i.e. the attacker needs to be at least 125 more efficient at killing a
victim than a single victim is at killing the attacker. For n = 20, n = 10, and
n = 5, the conditions are d > 30p, d > 6p, and d > 0.6p. While the numbers
are now shifted in favor of a ”gun availability to all” policy, the general conclu-
sions hold. If most attacks in the country occur in a one-against-many setting
involving large crowds where the attacker does not use an automatic weapon,
firearm-related deaths are probably minimized by the ”gun availability to all”
policy. If the crowds under attack are relatively small or if the attacker uses
an automatic weapon, gun-induced deaths are minimized by banning private
possession of firearms.
Having discussed the one-against-many scenario in some detail, it has to be
pointed out that while assaults on crowds generate the most dramatic outcomes
(many people shot at once), the great majority of gun-related deaths occur in a
one-against-one setting [5–7], which generates less press attention. Therefore, it
is likely that the results from the simpler one-against-one scenario are the ones
that should dictate policies when the aim is to minimize the overall gun-related
homicides across the country.
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Further complexities. We have discussed the prediction of the model in the
context of the parameter estimates using what we called the suburban model.
That is, we separate attacker and victim populations. We have shown, however,
that in the context of the inner city model, the condition for a ban of private
firearm possession becomes easier to fulfill. This model does not separate the
attacker and victim populations but instead describes a scenario where a large
fraction of the population can have criminal tendencies, and where a person
may either be an attacker or a victim depending on the situation, e.g. two
armed people getting into a fight, drug related crimes, etc. Because the subur-
ban model indicates that gun-related homicides are likely to be minimized by
a ban of private firearm possession, the same conclusion would be reached with
the inner city model. It has to be kept in mind though that parameter esti-
mates could be different depending on the setting, although there is currently
no information available about this in the literature. Related to this issue, it
is clear that crime is not uniform with respect to spatial locations. There are
areas with adverse socio-economic conditions which are characterized by high
homicide rates, and there are areas of relative safety with very few gun crimes.
While our model does not take space into account explicitly, it takes into ac-
count different scenarios (such as the suburbal model or the inner-city model).
The optimization problem solved here does not explicitly depend on the spatial
distribution of different crime conditions. Further questions about crime man-
agement can however be asked if one utilized a spatial extension of this model.
Another assumption that could be changed in the model is the dependency
of z(g) on the policy parameter g. In the model analyzed here, we assume that
the fraction of offenders that are not entitled to have a legal gun but get it
illegally, h, does not depend on g. Let us suppose that it does. In other words,
as the prevalence of firearms in the general population increases, the fraction of
criminals acquiring an illegal gun increases too. In this case, our general con-
clusions hold even stronger. As g increases, the frequency of crime will increase
even more, and the probability of death during an attack will remain the same
as in the original model.
An issue that we have ignored in our discussion so far are possible deterring
effects of gun ownership, i.e. the notion that non-homicide crimes, for example
burglaries, could occur less often if those offenders are deterred by the presence
of guns in households. Our analysis was concerned with minimizing gun-related
homicides, and not crime in general, which is a different topic and should be
the subject of future work. If a gun is present in households, and the bur-
glar would consequently carry a gun during the offense, however, the number
of gun-related deaths is likely to increase, even if perhaps the total number
of burglaries might decrease. This applies especially if guns in the household
are unlikely to protect against injury or death, as indicated in the literature [18].
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Finally, it is important to note that this paper only takes account of fac-
tors related to the gun control policy, and assumes a constant socio-economic
background. Of course in the real world a reduction in gun-related (and other)
homicides would require improvement of the living and work conditions and
education of underprivileged populations. Here we do not consider these issues.
It is important to emphasize that cultural and socio-economic differences exist
between different countries, making it impossible to draw direct comparisons.
A lower or higher rate of gun-related deaths is not only a function of gun con-
trol policies, but also of those other factors. Comparisons in the context of this
model are only possible within the same cultural and socio-economic space. We
single out the direct effects of gun-control policies and investigate those under
fixed cultural and socio-economic circumstances.
Conclusions
To conclude, this paper addresses the vigorous debate going on about the future
of gun policies. One side argues that because guns are the reason for the deaths,
stricter gun control policies should be introduced. The other side argues that
guns also protect the life of people, and that an increased prevalence of guns
in the general population could lead to fewer deaths. Rather than relying on
opinions, we investigated this debate scientifically, using mathematical, popu-
lation dynamic models to calculate the firearm-induced death rate of people as
a function of the gun control policy. The results show that in principle, both
arguments can be correct, depending on the parameters. Based on parameters
that could be estimated from previously published data, our model suggests
that in the context of one-against-one shootings, a ban of private firearm pos-
session minimizes gun-related deaths if the gun control law can be enforced at
least as effectively as in England/Wales. However, if a private firearm ban is not
practical or possible due to constitutional and cultural constraints, the model
and parameter measurements suggest that a partial reduction in firearms avail-
ability could lower gun-induced death rates. In a one-against-many scenario,
the situation is a little less clear. While in the context of assaults with au-
tomatic or semi-automatic weapons, gun ownership by the general population
is unlikely to minimize firearm-induced deaths, it could be the right strategy
when an attacker assaults a large crowd with a non-automatic weapon. The
one-against-many scenario is, however, less important than the one-against-one
scenario if the aim is to reduce the number of gun-related homicides in the
country, because most gun-related homicides involve the attack of single indi-
viduals [5–7]. The next step in this investigation is to perform further statistical
studies to estimate the crucial parameters of the model that we have discussed
here. These parameters are clearly identified by the model, which is perhaps the
most important contribution of this analysis. Detailed statistical measurements
would provide data that could further inform the design of gun control policies.
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Analysis
The absorbing states of the stochastic system are (i) all the states (0, i, j), where
the attacker has been shot, and (ii) (1, 0, 0), where all the people have been shot.
The state (0, 0,m) is unreachable from (1, i, j). Let us denote by hi,j→l,m the
probability to be absorbed in state (0, l,m) starting from state (1, i, j). The
goal is to calculate the function F (g), which is proportional to the probability
for an individual involved in an attack to die.
We have hi,j→l,m = 0 as long as l > i or m > j. Further, hi,j→0,m = 0 for all
(i, j,m). Let us denote by λi,j the probability to be absorbed in state (1, 0, 0)
starting from state (1, i, j). We must have
i∑
l=1
j∑
m=0
hi,j→l,m + λi,j = 1. (12)
The following equations can be written down for these variables, by using a
one-step analysis:
hi,j→i,j = (1− d)[1− (1 − p)
i] + (1− d)(1 − p)ihi,j→i,j ,
hi,j→i−1,j =
di
i+ j
[1− (1− p)i−1] +
di
i+ j
(1− p)i−1hi−1,j→i−1,j + (1− d)(1 − p)
ihi,j→i−1,j ,
hi,j→i,j−1 =
dj
i+ j
[1− (1− p)i] +
dj
i+ j
(1− p)ihi,j−1→i,j−1 + (1− d)(1 − p)
ihi,j→i,j−1 ,
hi,j→l,j =
di
i+ j
(1− p)i−1hi−1,j→l,j + (1− d)(1 − p)
ihi,j→l,j , l < i− 1,
hi,j→i,m =
dj
i+ j
(1− p)ihi,j−1→i,m + (1 − d)(1− p)
ihi,j→i,m, m < j − 1,
hi,j→l,m =
di
i+ j
(1− p)i−1hi−1,j→l,m +
dj
i+ j
(1− p)ihi,j−1→l,m + (1− d)(1 − p)
ihi,j→l,m,
l < i, m < j.
The values for all hij→lm can be calculated recursively from this system. For
completeness, we also write down the equation for the variable λi,j :
λi,j =
di
i+ j
(1 − p)i−1λi−1,j +
dj
i+ j
(1− p)iλi,j−1 + (1 − d)(1− p)
iλi,j .
One can check that equation (12) holds.
Given the probability to carry a gun cg, the probability to have i individuals
out of n armed is given by
n!
i!(n− i)!
(cg)i(1− cg)n−i,
and the probability to have l armed and m unarmed individuals still alive after
an attack is given by
n∑
i=1
n!
i!(n− i)!
(cg)i(1− cg)n−ihi,n−i→l,m.
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Figure 3: Results of the stochastic model of the one-against-many attack. (a) A
typical shape of the probability distribution of the number of people who survive an attack,
plotted for three different values of g. (b) The probability to survive an attack, F (g), as a
function of the gun control (please note the logarithmic scale). The function F (g) obtained in
formula (13) is plotted by a thick gray line. The solid black line corresponds to approximation
e−βg with β given by formula (14). The dashed line corresponds to approximation (16) with
γ = 1.6. Other parameters are n = 10, d = 0.1, p = 0.02, and c = 1.
Therefore, the probability to have k people out of n to survive the attack is
Pk =
k∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
n!
i!(n− i)!
(cg)i(1− cg)n−ihi,n−i→l,k−l.
Examples of this probability distribution for three different values of g are shown
in figure 3(a). The expected number of people that survive is given by
n∑
k=1
Pkk.
Therefore, the function F (g), proportional to the probability to be killed in an
attack, is given by
F (g) = 1−
1
n
n∑
k=1
Pkk. (13)
First of all, we can apply the one-against-many attack model for the case
n = 1. As expected, F (g) for n = 1 is a linear function of g, which can be
written as equation (3), with parameters β1 and β2 giving rise to the threshold
value of h,
β2
β1
=
d
d(1− p) + p
.
We can see that the stochastic model informs our previous simple model by
relating the quantity β2/β1 to the probability of the attacker to kill a victim
with one shot, d, and the probability of a victim to shoot the attacker, p. As
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expected, the quantity β2/β1 grows with d and decays with p. In other words,
the gun-mediated protection decays with d and it grows with p.
The expression for F for n > 1 is complicated. A typical shape of this
function is shown in figure 3(b), the thick gray line. We can calculate the
approximation for this function for small values of g, by setting
F (g) ≈ 1− βcg,
where
β =
p
n(d(1 − p) + p)n


n−1∑
j=1
j2dn−j(1− p)n−j−1(d(1 − p) + p)j−1
+ n2(1− d)(d(1 − p) + p)n−1
)
=
1
np2
(
2d2 + dp− 2d2p− 2dnp+ n2p2
− (2d(1− p) + p)dn+1(1 − p)n(d(1 − p) + p)−n
)
. (14)
Instead of working with the particular model described above, let us design
a simpler model, which would retain some of the properties of the stochastic
model considered, but be easier to analyze. First we notice that F ′ < 0 and
F ′′ > 0. Consider the following approximation of this function which satisfies
F ′ < 0 and F ′′ > 0:
F (g) ≈ e−βcg. (15)
Figure 3(b) shows that while expression (15) is a good approximation of the
function F (g) for small values of g, it deviates from the function F as g ap-
proaches 1, see the solid black line. The function F given by exact formula (13)
has a higher curvature for larger values of g (the thick gray line in figure 3(b)).
To mimic this trend, we will set
F (g) = e−βcg+γ(cg)
2
, (16)
where β > 0 and 0 < γ < β/(2c), such that F ′ < 0 for 0 ≤ g ≤ 1. This
approximation is shown in figure 3(b), the dashed line. In equation (16), β is
given by expression (14).
If γ = 0, we have F ′′ < 0, and the optimal strategies are the same as in the
one-against-one attack: only the two extreme strategies can minimize the gun-
induced death rate of people, i.e. either a ”ban of private firearm possession”
strategy (g = 1) or the ”gun availability to all” strategy (g = 1). Conditions
(10) (or (11) if c = 1) help separate the two cases. If we assume the existence of
a nonzero correction γ > 0 in the expression for F (g), it follows that inequality
(10) still plays a key role in separating two different cases, as described in the
Results section.
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